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I. Introduction
The extraction of shale gas has beenhailed as a “game
changer” in the United States and has restructured
the country’s energy landscape. The United States is
by far the biggest producer of shale gas and has the
longest history of extraction. The method of releas-
inghydrocarbons fromtheground throughhydraulic
fracturing is however also increasingly debated in
the European Union (EU) as a possible response to
both increasing energy demand in the European
Union and dependence on gas imports from third
countries such as Russia, while the technology is far
from being exercised on a commercial level in the
European Union as yet.
To date, most legal research on shale gas in the EU
has focussed on the micro- level of regulation, name-
ly on how shale gas is or should be regulated in dif-
ferentMember States, such as the United Kingdom,1
Germany2 or others.3 The analysis has mostly fo-
cused on the different steps along the shale gas val-
ue chain (planning, exploration, extraction and clo-
sure4) and the environmental impacts associated
with the activity (GHG emissions,5 impacts on water
resources,6 chemicals used in the fracturing
process7). While this is important as a first step to
gain a better understanding of the regulatory frame-
work as it stands and the associated gaps and loop-
holes for shale gas in the Member State as well as at
the European level, this is certainly not enough to
gain a full picture of the potential (or not) shale gas
has in the EU. For the next step, legal research needs
to move beyond this micro-perspective and focus on
a broader perception, namely the overall European
energy and environmental law and policy context. A
European research agenda for shale gas needs to
move beyond the analysis of the existing legal frame-
work - however incorporating also the lessons
learned from the United States shale gas experience
- and broaden it to the implications at the macro-lev-
el. More precisely, four additional aspects are crucial
in order to get a coherent idea on shale gas in the EU
regulatory landscape: 1. the division of competences
in the environmental and energy area between the
Member States, 2. possible impacts of the technolo-
gy on a Common European Energy Policy, 3. other
cross cutting energy and environmental issues, as
well as 4. a discussion of the precaution and preven-
tion principle in light of new technologies and scien-
tific uncertainties.
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1 D. Bryden, J. Nierinck and R. Parish, ‘UK shale gas: mapping the
current regulation and legal landscape’, (2014) 22 Environmental
Liability, 28-40.
2 M. Engelhardt, H. W. Louis, ‘Rechtliche Betrachtungen zum
Fracking‘, (2014) 36 Natur und Recht, 548-555.
3 For a comparative assessment on the regulatory provisions in 8
different Member States please refer to Milieu Ltd., ‘Study on the
regulatory provisions governing key aspects of unconventional
gas development in eight Member States.’,<http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/environment/integration/energy/pdf/Final%20Re-
port%2024072013.pdf> accessed 4 November 2014.
4 See for example the structure of the Milieu Ltd. Study, ibid.
5 ICF International, 'Mitigation of climate impacts of possible
future shale gas extraction in the EU: available technologies, best
practices and options for policy makers' <http://ec.europa.eu/cli-
ma/policies/eccp/docs/mitigation_shale_gas_en.pdf> accessed 4
November 2014.
6 For example L. Reins, ‘The Shale Gas Extraction Process and Its
Impacts on Water Resources’, (2011) 20 Review of European
Community & International Environmental Law, 300 - 312.
7 JRC, ‘Assessment of the use of substances in hydraulic fracturing of
shale gas reservoirs under REACH’ <http://publications.jrc.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/repository/bitstream/111111111/29386/1/req_jrc83512_as-
sessment_use_substances_hydraulic_fractur-
ing_shale_gas_reach.pdf> accessed 4 November 2014.
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II. The Vertical and Horizontal
Competences for Shale Gas after the
Reshuffling of the Environmental and
Energy Competences in the Lisbon
Treaty
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in
December 2009, the Union’s action on energy mat-
ters historically lacked an explicit legal basis. How-
ever, the absence of a Treaty provision did not pre-
vent the then Community from adopting legislation
in the energy sector. European legislation on energy
policy developed by means of other existing legal
bases: in particular the internal market, competition
and environmental protection competences. The in-
troduction of the Energy Title XXI in the Lisbon
Treaty changed the set up in both the environmen-
tal and energy field. What has been missing in legal
scholarship is an analysis of how this “new”8 technol-
ogy fits in the overall framework of the European
competences. The “clash” between or interplay of the
competences has not been assessed on a practical lev-
el. The case study of shale gas is the first example
where this plays out in practice and which impacts
both titles of the Treaty. It is not clear, how the new
Article 194 TFEU on energy issues evolves in prac-
tice. In particular, how does the provision on the
Member States right to determine their energy mix
plays out? Is this a means for Member States to opt
out of Union measures and policy? How shall con-
flicts of the legal basis be handled?How can environ-
mental protection and security of supply be guaran-
teed at the same time? Is a coherent regulation at all
possible? Does one have to be given priority over the
other? 9
III. The Impact of Shale Gas on a
Common European Energy Policy
Related to the discussion on vertical and horizontal
competences, but not the same, it needs to be dis-
cussed to what extent the case of shale gas will po-
tentially affect a common energy policy for the Eu-
ropean Union (‘CEP’). The latter has been discussed
by various stakeholders in the past 40 years.10 It ar-
guably would enable the EU to act with a common
voice in light of the depletion of energy reserves, the
need for a diversification of resources, and the re-
liance on imported energy from external sources.11
So far, a CEP has been mainly associated with infra-
structure concerns such as the building of pipelines
connecting the energy production countries with the
consuming countries in the EuropeanUnion (Nabuc-
co and Southstream are important keywords in this
regard)12 and the creation and completion of a sin-
gle European energy market (unbundling). Academ-
ic articles have discussed the changes in policy after
the gas crises in 2006 and 200913, as well as more re-
8 See further section V below regarding the need of a discussion on
whether the technology is really new and how this can potentially
impact its regulation.
9 Some of these questions have already been addressed in L. Reins,
‘In Search of the Legal Basis for Environmental and Energy Regu-
lation at the EU Level: The Case of Unconventional Gas Extrac-
tion’ (2014) 23 Review of European, Comparative & International
Environmental Law 125-133 ; as well as L. Reins, ‘Shale Gas in
the European Union: You, me, together? Reflections from a Sub-
sidiarity Perspective’ (2014) 12 Oil, Gas, Energy Law Intelligence
(3) 1-11.
10 See for example R. Bailey, ‘Headings for an EEC Common Energy
Policy’ (1976) 4 Energy Policy, 4; as well as T. Daintith, and L.
Hancher ‘Energy strategy in Europe: The legal framework’ 1986)
Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 15.
11 European Commission, Green Paper - A European Strategy for
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, Brussels (8 March
2006) COM, 105, at 4; for further information see: A. V. Belyi,
‘New dimensions of energy security of the enlarging EU and their
impact on relations with Russia’ (2003) 25 Journal of European
Integration, 351-369.
12 For example. S. Afifi, M. Hassan, and A. Zobaa, ‘The Impacts of
the Proposed Nabucco Gas Pipeline on EU Common Energy
Policy’ 8 Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy
1.
13 For example S. de Jong, J. Wouters, and S. Sterkx, ‘The 2009
Russian-Ukrainian Gas Dispute’, (2010) 15 European Foreign
Affairs Review, 511-38; as well as Pirani, S, J. Stern, and K. Yafi-
mava, ‘The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January: A Compre-
hensive Assessment’, (2009) Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
Working Paper, 27
Figure 1: Legal challenges for regulating shale gas
extraction in the European Union
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cent articles the Fukushima incident.14 One impor-
tant factor however has not been included in this de-
bate. Shale gas exploration and production is an
emerging trend in the EU and has the potential to
change the energy landscape in the Union and be-
yond.15 In its recent Communication, the Commis-
sion declares that ‘shale gas can be a possible substi-
tute formore carbon-intensive fossil fuels, an indige-
nous source of natural gas reducing dependency on
non-EU energy suppliers.’16 Further, already in 2011
the European Council agreed that ‘[i]n order to fur-
ther enhance its security of supply, Europe's poten-
tial for sustainable extraction and use of convention-
al and unconventional (shale gas and oil shale) fossil
fuel resources should be assessed.’17 The European
Council thus explicitly formulated amandate to eval-
uate shale gas exploration and extraction as a mean
to secure the European energy supply on a common
basis.
Considering the strong and very divergent posi-
tions the Member States have on shale gas (e.g. vot-
ing in Parliament and Council on the Revision of the
EIA Directive), but also the approach the Commis-
sion takes (Recommendation and not a proposal for
a Directive), it is questionable whether the current
way towards a common policy can be upheld in the
future. From today’s point of view it seems rather
possible that Member States, driven by the possibil-
ity to gain energy independence, rely on their com-
petence to determine their energy mix and pursue
their own policy regardless of pre-existing roadmaps
and strategies. In light of the trends and develop-
ments relating to shale gas, it needs to be examined
if and how the strategies and roadmaps adopted af-
ter the 2009 - which clearly pave the way towards a
common European energy policy - will be pursued
in the future.
IV. Other Cross-Cutting Energy Issues
The challenge of regulating and balancing energy
and environmental matters in a coherent way has al-
ways been a key challenge for lawmakers.18 In order
to establish how the regulatory design and policy im-
pacts the development of a technology, the current
procedure of dealing with cross- cutting energy is-
sues needs to be looked at, such as the regulation of
CCS, nanotechnology and the waste material versus
waste products approach19 as these issues also affect
several elements of the environment and posed reg-
ulatory challenges to the European institutions in the
past, meaning before the inclusion of a separate le-
gal basis on energy.
While all these technologies were - and to some
extent still are - perceived to be new, the regulatory
approaches to these technologies differ. The regula-
tory design debate regarding nanotechnologywas, at
least in the beginning, characterised by a cooperative
approach between industry, non-governmental orga-
nizations and the general public. Action on a Euro-
pean level includes aEuropean strategy fornanotech-
nology, a European action plan, and a common defi-
nition established though a Recommendation and a
code of conducts. However there is no specific legis-
lation on this matter. The general health, safety and
environmental legislation, such as the REACH Reg-
ulation, the Plant Protection Directive, and the so
called ‘newapproachon technicalharmonisationand
standardisation’ legislation (especially regardingma-
chinery, personal protective equipment, low-voltage,
medical devices, etc.) and more sector specific regu-
lation on for example cars, medical products, food or
cosmetics applies. The discussion surrounding the
CCS technology on the other side resulted in the
adoption of binding legislation. The CCS Directive
2009/31/EC amends theWater Framework Directive,
theWaste Directive and several other Directives. The
EuropeanCommission itself promotes that ‘although
the components of CCS are all known and deployed
at commercial scale, integrated systems are new, and
a clear regulatory framework is required. The EU's
14 C. Egenhofer, and A. Behrens, ‘The Future of EU Energy Policy
after Fukushima’ in: C. Egenhofer, et al.(eds.) ‘Does Europe need
a comprehensive Energy policy?’ (2011) 3 Intereconomics Re-
view of European Economic Policy Heidelberg Springer, 124-
142.
15 S. de Jong and W. Auping, ‘The Geopolitics of Shale Gas’, The
Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), available at
http://www.hcss.nl/reports/the-geopolitics-of-shale-gas/138/ ac-
cessed 4 November 2014.
16 European Commission, Communication on the exploration and
production of hydrocarbons (such as shale gas) using high volume
hydraulic fracturing in the EU, Brussles, 13 March 2014,
COM(2014) 23.
17 European Council Conclusions of 4 February 2011, Brussels, 8
March 2011, EUCO 2/1/11 REV 1, 4.
18 Especially regarding the areas of climate, air, land, biodiversity,
waste or water. See European Commission, DG Environment,
‘Energy and environment’ <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/inte-
gration/energy/index_en.htm> 04 November 2014.
19 See also G. Van Calster, ‘Handbook of EU Waste Law’ forthcom-
ing (forthcoming January 2015,) Oxford, Oxford University Press
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CCS Directive provides this.’20 EU waste policy has
for a long time employed a waste product approach:
it regulates waste cars, waste electric and electronic
equipment,waste batteries,miningwaste, packaging
waste, etc. The waste products approach means that
one material, e.g. PVC, is regulated differently, de-
pending on the product in which it ends up. This
would not seemcoherent, and the EUhas been study-
ing ways to remedy this.
In addition, over and above sectorial sets of Direc-
tives regulating specific elements of the environ-
ment, the European institutions have tried to devel-
op an integrated approach to the combined impact
of an activity on the environment, leading to an in-
tegrated system to control and prevent pollution. Im-
portant components of this system are the IPPC Di-
rective21, which has been recast and together with
the Large Combustion Plants Directive, the Waste
IncinerationDirective, the Solvents Emissions Direc-
tive, three Directives on Titanium Dioxide and the
newDirective on Industrial Emissions.22The later es-
tablished a ‘single clear and coherent legislative in-
strument,’23 however, exactly such a complex set of
Directives amounts to a ‘single, clear and coherent’
instrument is open to debate..
The most recent ‘new’ technology is shale gas hy-
draulic fracturing technology. The shale gas debate
in the European Union is characterised by the classi-
cal opposition of industry, NGOs, etc. A non-binding
Recommendation outlining minimum principles is
the only specific regulatory approach so far, besides
the general regulatory framework for conventional
gas. With analysing and comparing these legal
regimes and the legislativehistory thereof, important
conclusions and lessons can be learned for the regu-
lation of the shale gas technology.
V. ‘New’ Technologies and
Precaution/Prevention: in Light of
Scientific Uncertainties
Shale gas is often referred to as a ‘new’24 or ‘emerg-
ing’25 technology or resource, which is associated
with a lot of knowledge gaps and scientific uncertain-
ties about especially the environmental impacts.
Hence the technology is often perceived to be a risk
technology. The 18th coalition agreement of the grand
coalition in Germany for example refers to shale gas
as a technology with an ‘enormous risk potential’.26
However, one can question whether the technology
(and its impacts) is really new, and subject to uncer-
tainties or whether it is rather the likeliness of the
impactswhich are at question.27Theviewof thePres-
ident of theGermanFederal Institute forGeosciences
andNatural Resources (BGR), Prof. Dr. Hans-Joachim
Kümpel, hints in this direction: ‘when critics, in con-
nection with fracking, speak of an uncontrollable
high-risk technology, from a scientific perspective
this is simply wrong.’28
The perception of the risk potential of the technol-
ogy thus differs amongst stakeholders (and not only
in termsof theclassical industry/NGOdivide);29 from
an academic point of view, the role of science, the sta-
tus as shale gas as a ‘risk’ or ‘new’ technology, and
theoverarching relationship and contextwith theEu-
ropean environmental principles, especially the pre-
vention and precautionary principle needs to be ex-
amined.Where is the ‘new’ in new technologies? and
how does this affect the regulation? Is there really
much uncertainty in shale? Arguably, the uncertain-
ties range around the likelihood of the impacts rather
20 See European Commission, DG CLIMA, ‘Ensuring safe and
environmentally sound CCS’ <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/poli-
cies/lowcarbon/ccs/index_en.htm> accessed 4 November 2014.
21 Council Directive 96/61 concerning integrated pollution preven-
tion and control, [1996] OJ L 257/26.
22 Directive 2010/75 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution
prevention and control) [2010] OJ L 334/17.
23 European Commission, New Proposal for a Directive on industrial
emissions, <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pollutants/sta-
tionary/ippc/proposal.htm> 04 November 2014.
24 See for example Argonne National Laboratory, ‘Hydraulic Fractur-
ing and Shale Gas Production: Technology, Impacts, and Regula-
tion’, 7, 12 ,18, <http://www.afdc.energy.gov/uploads/publica-
tion/anl_hydraulic_fracturing.pdf> Accessed 04 November 2014..
25 For example, U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘Review of
Emerging Resources’ available at <http://www.eia.gov/analy-
sis/studies/usshalegas/pdf/usshaleplays.pdf> accessed 4 Novem-
ber 2014.
26 Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, „Deutschlands
Zukunft gestalten' <https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/me-
dia/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf> accessed 4 November
2014, 44.
27 This is already touched upon in L. Reins, ‘European minimum
principles for shale gas: preliminary insights with reference to the
precautionary principle’, (2014) 22 Environmental Liability, 16-
27.
28 German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources
(BGR), Kopenhagener Erklärung: Bei Schiefergas-Bewertung in
Europa den Sachverstand der Geologischen Dienste einbeziehen,
Press release, 25.09.2014 <http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Gemein-
sames/Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/Pressemitteilungen/BGR/bgr-
140925_kopenhagener_erklaerung.html?nn=1542132> accessed
4 November 2014.
29 G. N. Mandel, ‘Regulating Emerging Technologies’ (2009) 1 Law,
Innovation and Technology, 1.
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than around the impacts itself. Thanks to the US ex-
perience we do already have relevant practical expe-
rience with the technology as well as a good under-
standingwhat canhappen.Wedohowever, not know
yet how likely and to what extent, this technology
will impact in practice. Once this is established, the
best way of regulating and preventing negative ef-
fects will follow. If this is the de facto discussion, aca-
demic attention needs to shift away from debating
theprecautionaryprinciple in relationwith shale gas,
and move to a prevention perspective. How can the
risks (no more uncertainties) be best addressed and
prevented to happen in practice? 30 This does not on-
ly have a solely academic angle, but also practical rel-
evance for operators and regulatory authorities, es-
pecially regarding environmental liability.31
VI. Conclusion
Shale gas research in the EuropeanUnion is complex
and current, however the focus set by legal scholars
for now is too narrow. In order to gain a real under-
standing on the regulatory issues involved, as well as
the place and potential of shale gas in the overall Eu-
ropean energy and environmental law and policy
framework, academia needs to broaden its perspec-
tive and consider shale gaswithin the additional four
elements discussed above.
30 See also L. Reins, ‘European minimum principles for shale gas:
preliminary insights with reference to the precautionary principle’
22 Environmental Liability, 16-27.
31 ibid.
